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  F u t u r e
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed in 1977 to combat the effects 
of  discriminatory lending practices and disinvestment in low- and moderate income 
communities.  It focuses on improving access for underserved communities, rather 
than underserved individuals.  This spatial focus has drawn criticism since its passage, 
and changes in the lending industry and urban real estate markets call into question its 
relevance today.  This paper will discuss the mechanics of  the CRA, its effectiveness,  and its 
relationship with two timely urban issues: gentrification and predatory lending.
The US Congress passed the Community Reinvestment 
Act (CRA) in 1977 to encourage investment in low- and 
moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods where redlining, 
white flight and suburban migration had weakened the 
commercial and housing markets.  The CRA was meant 
to act in concert with the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) 
to combat racial discrimination within the lending industry 
and expand access to credit for targeted areas.  Since 
its passage, a debate has raged about its effectiveness, 
appropriateness, and cost-benefit ratio.  Criticism comes 
from both sides, with community groups charging that 
the Act is too lenient and that CRA scores are artificially 
inflated, while members of  the banking industry point to 
its costs and allege that community groups use the CRA 
for unfair “rent-seeking” (Barr 2005).  This criticism, 
combined with recent changes in the lending industry and 
urban real estate markets, warrants a reevaluation of  the 
efficacy and relevance of  the CRA. 
The banking industry has undergone many changes in 
the past two decades with deregulation, the exponential 
growth of  technology, and the globalization of  many 
banking services.  These changes have inevitably had a 
major impact on the effectiveness of  the CRA, which was 
designed in a very different banking era.  Moreover, the 
changing market conditions of  inner-city neighborhoods 
raise concerns about the wisdom of  a spatially-focused 
strategy to improve credit access to LMI borrowers.  The 
CRA may reward banks for lending to gentrifiers while 
still denying good credit to LMI applicants.  Subprime, or 
even predatory credit, may be all that is available to LMI 
borrowers in CRA-designated areas.  Because of  regulatory 
gaps, banks may actually receive CRA credit for engaging 
in predatory loans that harm borrowers and fuel blight and 
abandonment.  These changes beg the question of  whether 
the CRA now contributes to precisely the detrimental 
effects it was originally designed to address.  
This paper will outline the major features of  the CRA and 
its enforcement, evaluate its effectiveness, both historically 
and contemporaneously, and conclude by examining its 
relationship with two timely concerns: gentrification and 
predatory lending.
C R A  E v a l u a t i o n  a n d  E n f o r c e m e n t
The CRA was passed in 1977 as a proactive measure to undo 
the harm caused by years of  redlining and disinvestment 
in urban, LMI, largely minority neighborhoods.  The law 
is based on the idea that federally-insured banks have 
an obligation to meet the needs of  all members of  the 
communities in which they are located.  Since banks 
receive special privileges from the government and raise 
capital in those areas, they owe this service both to the 
larger public and to their specific communities.  The law 
targets community needs in three areas: access to credit, 
investment, and access to depository and other banking 
services—all critical pieces of  improving the quality of  life 
in LMI neighborhoods (Engel and McCoy 2002). 
To counter the effects of  geographic discrimination, 
the CRA focuses on the community rather than the 
individual.  As Johnson, Kemp, and Nguyen (2002) 
 write, “Geographic discriminatory policies are rooted in 
the lender’s opinion that collateral in certain communities 
are likely to lose value, resulting in a loss to the lender.  As 
a consequence, lending decisions are made without paying 
attention to the credentials of  the particular applicant or 
the applicant’s specific collateral” (91).  Lenders make 
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assumptions about applicants and their property based on 
location alone, failing to consider the credit-worthiness 
of  the individual.   Regulatory agencies, therefore, 
measure how well institutions comply with the community’s 
needs, not the needs of  individual applicants.  Clearly, a 
community is made up of  individuals, but the law focuses 
on neighborhood-level effects.  Ideologically, this focus is 
admirable and refreshing in a society that focuses so much 
on the individual.  In practical terms, however, potential 
problems exist, especially in relation to the increasing 
phenomena of  gentrification and predatory lending.
Three tests are used to measure a bank’s performance 
in three areas: providing credit, investing, and serving 
an area’s deposit needs.  First, the lending test, which 
counts for half  of  the CRA score, evaluates whether an 
institution provides equitable and adequate credit within 
its CRA area (Barr 2005).  The five performance criteria 
are lending activity, geographic distribution, borrower 
characteristics, community development lending, and the 
degree to which the bank’s lending practices are innovative 
and flexible (Johnson, Kemp, and Nguyen 2002). Second, 
the investment test determines the extent to which the 
institution has invested in the community, whether it 
fills gaps left by the market, and how well it responds 
to community needs (Barr 2005).   Last, the service test, 
which accounts for one quarter of  the overall score 
(Stegman, Cochran, and Faris 2002), focuses on whether 
the institution adequately meets the community’s deposit 
and service needs (Barr 2005).  The service test is the 
broadest and least emphasized of  the three.  Its weakness 
has drawn criticism from those who argue that access to 
depository services is critical to financial health (Stegman, 
Cochran, and Faris 2002).   Individuals unable to open a 
bank account may resort to check-cashing services that 
charge significant premiums and payday loans that can 
quickly destroy a borrower’s credit.    
Based on these three tests, the regulatory agency 
assigns a numerical score that falls into one of  four 
ranges: outstanding, satisfactory, needs improvement, 
and substantial noncompliance. The agency also issues 
a report explaining the reasoning behind the score 
(Marisco 2003).  In 1990, the law was changed to make 
these reports publicly available (Litan et al 
2000, 11).  If  unfavorable, they can create 
a public relations debacle for the financial 
institution.      
One innovative feature of  the CRA is its 
diffuse allocation of  enforcement capacity. 
When a bank applies for a merger or 
acquisition or wants to open or close a bank 
branch, community groups, competitors, and 
supervisory agencies have the opportunity 
to protest the application on the grounds 
that the bank has failed to meet CRA 
requirements (Johnson and Sarkar 1996). 
Putting power in the hands of  community 
groups meets the ideological challenge of  
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society: a more 
equitable distribution of  both wealth and 
power.  Through the protest process, the CRA 
forces major financial institutions to stop 
and take notice of  community demands. 
Protests, however, can interfere with the 
efficiency of  the banking industry, eating 
into its profits and creating incentives to 
pass costs on to consumers.  Critics argue 
that the CRA actually hurts consumers, 
including the LMI group that it is designed 
to benefit, by raising operational costs.  The 
more time banks spend embroiled in the 
regulatory process, the more overhead costs 
accumulate.  While this may be true to some 
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degree, these critics fail to note that many of  the LMI 
customers that the CRA “harms” in this manner, would 
not be customers in the first place without the Act.
Most protests do not result in action by supervisory 
authorities.  From 1977 to 1990, the Federal Reserve 
rejected only one of  182 protested applications (Johnson 
and Sarkar 1996, 786).  The threat of  protest and its 
attendant costs, however, make banks more open to both 
formal and informal agreements with community groups 
unhappy with their performance (Bostic and Robinson 
2004). CRA agreements benefit both parties: the financial 
institution lowers the cost of  CRA compliance by reducing 
the risk of  protest, and the community group receives 
concessions without too great a fight (Johnson and Sarkar 
1996). 
The cost and effectiveness of  the CRA may vary depending 
on the size and scope of  the bank.  Researchers Bostic 
and Robinson (2004) hypothesize that larger banks have 
a greater incentive to comply with CRA regulations than 
smaller banks because the opportunity for protest occurs 
when an institution attempts to acquire or merge with 
another bank, an endeavor that small community banks 
are less likely to undergo.  On the other hand, larger 
banks depend less on their local reputation: their brands 
are national, even global, and can sustain the ire of  one 
community.  Small banks rely more heavily on their 
relationship with the community in which they are located 
and would have a difficult time weathering the criticism of  
local community groups.  
R e d l i n i n g  a n d  P a s t  D i s i n v e s t m e n t
Policy-makers designed the CRA to address the 
discrimination of  the past and complement laws aimed 
at eradicating current discriminatory lending.  Until the 
1970s, redlining entire neighborhoods and choking off  the 
flow of  credit and investment to these areas was common. 
Institutions justified this practice by citing the perceived 
risk associated with these areas: they could not be expected 
to make unsound investments.  
Johnson and Sarkar (1996) identify two types of  
redlining—rational and irrational.  Rational redlining 
occurs when a bank refuses to lend in an area based on 
justifiable differences in risk and profitability.  Some of  
these extra costs include the lack of  information about 
the creditworthiness of  customers, low financial literacy 
that requires extra time and attention by loan agents, and 
poor credit histories that make lending a riskier prospect. 
Irrational redlining occurs when a bank refuses to lend 
despite the potential for profit.  This type of  redlining 
might occur as a result of  outright discrimination or simply 
habit.  
The CRA focuses on addressing the latter form of  
redlining, and, in doing so, could be a boon to both the 
banking industry and the population the law targets.  Some 
argue that the CRA opened markets previously neglected 
because of  years of  systematic, irrational redlining.  In 
a 1996 survey, 98 percent of  large residential mortgage 
lenders found CRA loans profitable, and 24 percent found 
them at least as profitable as other loans (Federal Reserve 
Board 1999, 4).  A bank pioneering alone through previously 
unexplored markets faces potential risks because of  a lack 
of  information about borrowers in these areas, but when 
all banks are required to provide credit to consumers, 
the risk is diffused across all lenders and the information 
needed to make good lending choices to residents of  these 
areas grows.  Thus access to credit has a snowballing effect: 
once a bank enters a market and gathers information, the 
community becomes a more favorable environment for 
other investors as the market becomes more liquid (Barr 
2001).
E f f e c t i v e n e s s
The value of  the CRA hinges on one question: does the 
act improve access to credit and other banking services 
for LMI communities?  Most research has found positive 
results.  Reports indicate that the CRA attacks market 
failures by encouraging banks to meet the credit needs of  
their communities (Barr 2005).  Because the CRA awards 
points based on the innovativeness of  the lending products 
and strategies employed by an institution, it has spurred a 
variety of  creative solutions to the difficulties of  entering 
new markets and lending in LMI communities.  For 
instance, banks have banded together to form Community 
Development Corporations (CDCs), invested in credit 
counseling programs and created specialized branches 
within their institutions to administer the CRA process 
(Barr 2006).  These trends are all positive.  
Unfortunately, there is no control case.  It is possible, 
as some in the banking industry assert, that these trends 
would occur even without the CRA, as the lending markets 
for middle- and upper-income populations become 
saturated and institutions seek out new markets.  However, 
one study that sought to isolate the effects of  the CRA 
compared each bank’s CRA-eligible lending to the non-
CRA-eligible lending.  It found that between 1993 and 
1998, CRA-eligible mortgages increased by 39 percent, 
whereas non-CRA-eligible mortgages increased by only 
17 percent (Barr 2006).  Given these positive signs and 
the history of  past disinvestment, upholding a strong CRA 
continues to be justified.
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C h a n g e s  i n  t h e  L e n d i n g  I n d u s t r y
At one time, lending was primarily a local activity.  Changes 
in the banking industry have made capital largely aspatial, 
no longer fixed to a local community but diffused around 
the globe and online.  Have these changes made the CRA 
irrelevant and ineffective?  For instance, how should an 
institution’s CRA assessment area be defined when its 
capital is spread across nations?  
These changes undermine one of  the primary justifications 
for the CRA: the idea that a lending institution owes 
something to the community from whom its capital is 
raised.  But when capital is raised everywhere and nowhere, 
how much does a bank owe to the community in which it 
is located only in the strictest, bricks-and-mortar fashion? 
Another justification for the CRA, however, still holds 
true: banks receive special privileges and charters from the 
government.  Therefore, the government can expect banks 
to offer these services. 
Technological innovations may create further imbalances 
in access to credit and other financial services.  As more 
lenders move their services online, credit opportunities 
wither for those without regular computer access.  The 
“digital divide” could erase some of  the progress made in 
the past quarter-century by the CRA and other fair lending 
laws. Online banking presents an ideal solution to financial 
institutions looking to circumvent not only the CRA itself  
but the whole spirit of  the law.  As Johnson, Kemp, and 
Nguyen (2002) write, “What could be a more attractive 
customer base, since those persons who can afford a 
computer and Internet service are essentially the well-to-
do?” (102)   
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While some worry that the Internet will become “a more 
efficient avenue for discriminatory lending practices” (101), 
the main concern is that these services are not currently 
regulated by the CRA.  Extending CRA coverage to these 
services would come up against two roadblocks.  First, 
these institutions accept deposits well beyond the scope 
of  their physical community (Johnson, Kemp and Nguyen 
2002). Defining the CRA assessment area, therefore, 
would present significant challenges and might be attacked 
by critics as arbitrary and outdated.  Second, because of  its 
controversial nature, any expansion to the CRA will meet 
significant political opposition.   These challenges stand in 
the way of  maintaining the effectiveness of  the CRA.
T h e  C R A  a n d  G e n t r i f i c a t i o n
Ironically, the lack of  access to credit in LMI communities 
may be what keeps them affordable.  Redlining starved 
access to credit for all residents of  an area, failing to 
distinguish between those deemed creditworthy and those 
deemed uncreditworthy.  Today’s system, which mandates 
fair lending across all communities, combined with 
sophisticated systems to determine the risk of  lending to a 
particular applicant, may actually increase the vulnerability 
of  LMI households in neighborhoods that lie in the path of  
gentrification.  As Wyly et al (2001) write, “When affluent 
professionals begin to search for relatively affordable 
homes in the inner city, LMI residents are threatened with 
rising housing costs and city-wide reductions in the supply 
of  low-cost housing” (89). 
The CRA may fuel gentrification since outsiders looking to 
purchase cheap real estate may have their loans approved, 
while current residents may still be unable to access credit. 
In the era of  gentrification, “the traditional dichotomy 
of  urban investment (loan approved or denied) has 
been complicated by much greater stratification among 
those who do receive credit” (Wyly and Hammel 2004, 
8).  Meanwhile, greater market demand for real estate in 
inner-city neighborhoods increases values along with costs, 
potentially forcing displacement of  current residents. 
Wyly and Hammel (2004) write, “Working-class and 
racially marginalized people and places fare poorly in this 
process—facing either exploitive credit terms nurtured 
by predatory brokers and loan officers backed by Wall 
Street investors and global capital, or outright exclusion as 
displacement and housing market inflation remake cities 
for the elite professional classes” (3).
In this new era, the CRA may be counterproductive 
since “[s]patially-defined policy goals often provide CRA 
credits to banks for making loans to upper-middle class 
gentrifiers in the inner city” (8).  It depends on how one 
defines success.  If  one focuses on neighborhood-level 
change, then the CRA has done its job: real estate values 
in the neighborhood have gone up, most likely along with 
maintenance of  the properties and general upkeep of  the 
area.  However, if  one looks to the individual level, the 
LMI households living in the neighborhood may have had 
to relocate to another depressed neighborhood because 
of  increased costs.  LMI renters, of  course, would benefit 
the least because they would be forced to move with no 
attendant increase in wealth.  LMI homeowners, on the 
other hand, may be forced to move but will at least benefit 
from increased values when they sell their homes. 
      
T h e  C R A  a n d  P r e d a t o r y  L e n d i n g
No consensus exists about the connection between the 
CRA and predatory lending.  The prevalence of  predatory 
lenders in LMI communities may demonstrate the failure 
of  the CRA to encourage sufficient lending.  Predatory 
lenders may fill the gap created by the absence of  traditional 
lending institutions.  If  the CRA were working as its 
designers intended, there would be no lending vacuum for 
predatory lenders to exploit.  Perhaps it is too soon to fully 
assess the law’s effectiveness.  Only 30 years have elapsed 
since the passage of  the CRA, and much evidence exists 
that lending has moved in the right direction.  If  nothing 
else, the CRA encouraged banks to take a second look 
at previously excluded communities and understand that 
there are profitable ways to lend within them. 
Some of  this lending takes the form of  subprime loans, 
a complicated and controversial topic.  Not all subprime 
loans are exploitive; some are simply the best credit that 
borrowers can access because of  low credit scores.  When 
it comes to counting subprime loans toward a bank’s 
CRA credit, however, regulators should be cautious. 
As Richard Marisco writes, “A bank that is engaged in 
subprime lending, which by definition is more costly to the 
borrower than prime lending, may be failing to ‘meet’ the 
credit needs of  the community; while it may be originating 
a large number of  loans, these loans may not be on the 
best terms for and affordable to the borrower” (Marisco 
2003, 742).  Predatory loans comprise a subset of  the 
subprime market; they are the loans that have exploitive 
and detrimental terms.  These loans cause more harm than 
good by trapping borrowers in a cycle of  debt from which 
they might never extricate themselves.  
Recently, great attention has been paid to the effects 
of  subprime loans on mortgage foreclosures.  These 
foreclosures have had a disproportionate impact on 
LMI, largely minority areas where mortgage originations 
increased by 40 percent from 1993 to 1997, compared to a 
nationwide increase of  only 20 percent (Wyly et al 2004, 8). 
The effects of  widespread foreclosure have been especially 
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pronounced in LMI neighborhoods, not only because 
residents are less likely to have access to low-cost credit but 
also because LMI borrowers will find it harder to weather 
fluctuations in the economy given their precarious financial 
position.  Since many LMI communities have suffered 
decades of  disinvestment, the effect of  a single foreclosure 
is much greater than in a neighborhood that is stronger 
economically.  As Immergluck and Smith (2005) observe, 
“in middle- and upper-income areas…foreclosures are less 
likely to lead to abandoned buildings and neighborhood 
blight” (368).  In these areas, the stronger real estate market 
restricts foreclosure to the level of  a personal tragedy: 
someone has lost her home, but it will simply pass on to a 
new owner.        
Most parties agree that predatory loans should not earn 
banks CRA credit.  If  they are considered at all, they 
should detract from the institution’s overall CRA score.  In 
a note issued by federal banking agencies in 2001, questions 
were raised about the extent to which predatory lending is 
monitored.  The note stated, “Some are concerned that 
the regulations generally seem to provide consideration of  
loans without regard to whether the lending activities are 
appropriate” (CRA Regulations, quoted in Marisco 2003, 
743).  It went on to suggest that, “a CRA examination 
also should include consideration of  whether certain loans 
contain harmful or abusive terms and, therefore, do not 
help meet community credit needs” (CRA Regulations, 
quoted in Marisco 2003, 743).  It then asks, “Does the 
lending test effectively assess an institution’s record of  
helping to meet the credit needs of  its entire community? 
If  so, why?  If  not, how should the regulations be revised?” 
(CRA Regulations, quoted in Marisco 2003, 743).  If  this 
exchange is any indication, it would seem that no system 
is in place for evaluating predatory loans within the 
CRA regulatory system.  Predatory loans can be counted 
along with legitimate subprime and prime loans to help 
a bank earn an “outstanding” or “satisfactory” rating. 
Engel and McCoy (2002) assert that “both origination 
and brokerage activities may qualify for CRA credit even 
when they involve predatory loans” (1575).  Predatory 
loans do not add value to a community; they drain that 
value away, strip equity from homes, and leave borrowers 
in desperate circumstances.  An influx of  predatory loans 
will leave a community in worse straits than if  it had no 
access to credit at all.  As Engel and McCoy (2002) write, 
“If  the CRA is creating incentives for banks to engage in 
predatory lending, the CRA is actually defeating one of  its 
stated goals” (1577-78).
Banks can be involved with predatory loans indirectly by 
purchasing loans on the secondary market or financing 
subprime lenders.  Engel and McCoy (2002) write, “These 
bank activities raise CRA implications because some 
of  the activities receive explicit federal guarantees while 
others may benefit more generally from federal subsidies” 
(1585). 
Another way that CRA-regulated banks can benefit 
from the subprime and predatory lending industries is 
by acquiring non-bank affiliates that are not regulated by 
the CRA.  “Large national prime banks have established 
specialized subsidiaries focused on particular types of  
loans, marketed to targeted groups and/or neighborhoods, 
to reap lucrative profits without tarnishing brand-name 
reputations” (Wyly and Hammel 2004, 8-9).  In 2000, non-
bank entities owned by bank holding companies accounted 
for eight of  the ten largest subprime lenders.  These non-
bank affiliates are exempt from CRA scrutiny unless they 
volunteer for it, and since  there are no incentives to do so, 
they remain unregulated and free to engage in detrimental 
lending practices (Engel and McCoy 2002).  
Engel and McCoy (2002) argue that “if  non-bank affiliates 
and subsidiaries benefit from federal subsidies, we need 
to consider whether banks should be penalized for using 
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subsidies to finance predatory lending” (1588).  The profits 
from these abusive lending practices still indirectly accrue to 
CRA-regulated agencies so that defining banks’ operations 
too narrowly can allow them to delegate their abusive (and 
profitable) lending practices to affiliates outside the scope 
of  the CRA, thereby rendering the law less effective.
C o n c l u s i o n
The CRA made significant progress in accomplishing 
what Congress intended.  Lending and investment in 
LMI neighborhoods has increased in the years since its 
passage.  Though it is still relevant and effective, significant 
challenges to the CRA have emerged in the past two 
decades.  Regulatory agencies must step in to monitor 
the effects of  predatory lending and online banking to 
ensure that the CRA remains effective in this new lending 
era.  The effects of  gentrification are beyond the scope 
of  current CRA regulations, but Congress could consider 
adding a provision that takes the income of  borrowers into 
account on an institution’s CRA evaluation and excludes 
those above a certain range.  This adjustment would target 
those most in need of  access to credit and not give CRA 
credit to banks for fueling the gentrification of  inner-city 
neighborhoods.  Moreover, predatory lending seems to be 
a loophole in the CRA that the federal government should 
work aggressively to close.  Under no circumstances 
should CRA-regulated lending institutions receive credit 
for making loans that have abusive terms and that will 
undermine the credit health of  individuals and the integrity 
of  communities. 
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